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Drew Fudenberg
Results: 72

#	Item
31	UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles ESSAYS ON REPUTATION A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2001-07-07 10:59:50 Economics David K. Levine Nash equilibrium David Hirshleifer Drew Fudenberg Minimax Best response Reputation Repeated game Game theory Problem solving Mathematics
32	MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.dklevine.com Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50 Nash equilibrium Extensive-form game Centipede game Solution concept Outcome Strategy Determinacy Normal-form game Best response Game theory Problem solving Self-confirming equilibrium
33	Economic Publications in Chinese Yong Wang September 2005 TRANSLATED BOOKS (into Chinese[removed]Game Theory, by Drew Fudenberg, and J. Tirole, MIT Press; China Renmin University Press, [removed]Individual Strategy and S Add to Reading List Source URL: ihome.ust.hk Language: English - Date: 2009-07-29 00:40:44 Drew Fudenberg Justin Yifu Lin Economic growth Technological change Economics China Center for Economic Research Development economics
34	Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: www.dklevine.com Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41 Outcome Strategy Normal-form game Repeated game Risk dominance Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
35	A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: November 1, 2007 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.dklevine.com Language: English - Date: 2007-12-13 13:39:35 Generating functions Normal distribution Berry–Esseen theorem Integration by substitution Central limit theorem Moment-generating function Probability theory Mathematical analysis Statistics
36	The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.dklevine.com Language: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12 Outcome Quadrature amplitude modulation Strategy Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Normal-form game Repeated game Risk dominance Epsilon-equilibrium Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
37	Reexamining Coherent Arbitrariness for the Evaluation of Common Goods and Simple Lotteries§ Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine* and Zacharias Maniadis* Abstract We reexamine the effects of the anchoring manipulation of Add to Reading List Source URL: www.dklevine.com Language: English - Date: 2011-03-25 09:56:10** Knowledge Science Decision theory Willingness to accept Experimental economics Social psychology Lottery Willingness to pay Randomness Economics Business economics Microeconomics
38	An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 5, 2006 In their wide-ranging and provocative discussion, Shoham, Powers and Grenager (SPG) survey several large literatu Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2006-10-05 10:44:53 Science Drew Fudenberg Self-confirming equilibrium David K. Levine Fictitious play Nash equilibrium Solution concept Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Best response Game theory Problem solving Economics
39	Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39 Self-confirming equilibrium Nash equilibrium Bayesian game Extensive-form game Strategy Solution concept Strategic dominance Best response The Intuitive Criterion Game theory Problem solving Economics
40	Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40 Nash equilibrium Subgame Strategy Information set Bayesian game Game theory Extensive-form game Solution concept

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